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1 Introduction
The standard hypotheses in the international macroeconomic literature imply
that when countries are identical aggregate shocks do not a¤ect the terms
of trade, relative consumptions, relative incomes and the current accounts of
the countries. Instead, in this paper, a common shock to a set of identical
countries has idiosyncratic e¤ects. The countries are similar in the sense that
they have identical preferences and technologies, and aggregate e¢ ciency and
initial aggregate wealth levels. However, the distribution of e¢ ciency or the
distribution of wealth may be di¤erent across countries. Each country is
specialized in the production of a good, but households consume the same
composite good.
Erosa and Ventura (2002) survey some facts for households in the U.S..
First, high income individuals use cash and cash plus checks for a smaller
fraction of their transactions than low income individuals. Second, the frac-
tion of household wealth held in liquid assets decreases with income and
wealth. And third, a nontrivial fraction of households do not own a check-
ing account or do not use credit cards to perform transactions. We build
a model that replicates these facts when agents are heterogeneous agents.
The the way inequality interacts with changes in the target for ination can
explain di¤erent aggregate outcomes across countries but also the observed
correlation between ination and inequality. Participation changes in the
credit market, which happen both at the intensive as well as at the extensive
margin, are important when there is a alteration in the target for ination.
A result of this paper is that monetary policy in a monetary union is
more potent than in the old view, where a common monetary policy can-
not a¤ect similar countries di¤erently. We compute that the idiosyncratic
e¤ects of a monetary policy change, in a simple model where countries have
identical aggregate initial wealth but distributed di¤erently across countries,
and conclude that the asymmetric e¤ects have the potential to be quanti-
tatively signicant. We focus on a change in the target for ination in a
monetary union, but the conclusions extend to any other change in policy or
any common shock.
We consider that in each country households can do transactions either
with cash or credit. The production of credit uses scarce resources while the
production of cash does not. The credit technology has increasing returns to
scale which implies that richer households tend to use relatively less cash to
do transactions than poorer households. The consequence of this is that the
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e¤ective price of each unit of consumption is lower for the richer households.
The change to a lower ination regime decreases the cost of using cash to do
transactions and leads all households to use more cash in their transactions.
As a consequence, e¢ ciency and equity in all countries increase for all levels
of inequality. The terms of trade become closer to unity for all levels of
inequality, too. That is the prices of the goods produced in the countries
become more similar.
Another result is that a redistribution of initial wealth in the home coun-
try has aggregate e¤ects not only at home, but also in the other countries.
In the home country, as households become more equal cash gets used in
more transactions, which increases the tax base of the ination tax and al-
lows a substantial decrease in the consumption tax rate. The consequence
is an increase in e¢ ciency and in the terms of trade in the home country.
Also, the redistribution of the initial wealth in the home country has e¤ects
in the other countries, but of a smaller magnitude. In the other countries:
the e¤ective prices of consumption decrease and consumptions increase for
all households, the consumption tax rate decreases, and e¢ ciency increases.
Equity measured as the ratio between the utility level of any household and
the utility level of a richer household increases as well as production. The
highest levels of equity and e¢ ciency in the other countries are achieved when
the redistribution of wealth in the home country makes all households equal.
Our results are in line with the literature that nds a positive correla-
tion between average ination and measures of income inequality. Albanesi
(2007) nds a strong correlation between ination and the Gini coe¢ cient for
51 industrialized and developing countries between 1966 and 1990. Romer
and Romer (1998) have quantitatively similar results obtained by regressing
inequality on ination. Easterly and Fisher (2001) present indirect evidence
on the distributional e¤ects of ination, using household pooling data on
38 countries, nd that the low income households perceive ination as more
costly than high income households.
There is also a theoretical literature that studies the aggregate implica-
tions of ination when there is heterogeneity in the economy, and how this
regime change a¤ects inequality. Akyol (2004) studies optimal risk-sharing
in a pure exchange economy where bonds and money are held only for pre-
cautionary purposes. Positive ination in this model ensures maximum risk-
sharing, redistributing surplus to low-income agents. In a random matching
model Molico (2006) shows that some ination can improve social welfare
because higher ination can reduce wealth and price dispersion. Boel and
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Camera (2011) have a model based on Lagos and Wright (2005), where they
show that the impact of ination depends on the nancial sophistication of
the economy. If money is the only asset, then ination hurts more the wealth-
ier and more productive agents, while those poorer and less productive may
even benet from ination. In a more sophisticated nancial environment
where agents can insure against consumption risk, with other assets, the op-
posite result holds. Erosa and Ventura (2002) in a transactions cost model
show that a decline in ination increases e¢ ciency and improves equity.
In Adão and Correia (2018) it is shown that heterogeneity across house-
holds plays a key role in our understanding of the aggregate e¤ects of a decline
in the expected average ination in a closed economy set-up. Here, we want
to extend the analysis to a monetary union environment like the Euro area.
More specically we want to evaluate how the various countries that belong
to a monetary union, i.e. share the same nominal interest rate and have the
same currency are a¤ected by a change in the ination target. At the same
time we also want to understand the e¤ects on the heterogeneous agents
that live in each of the countries. We do not focus on the questions that
were raised with the recent crisis, which emphasize the ability of the policy
to stabilize the economies by moving the policy interest rate given the target.
We abstract from cycles, in normal or crisis periods, and as such we consider
a deterministic environment. Also, we do not want to examine what is the
optimal monetary union or what is the best target ination for an area that
is composed by countries at di¤erent stages of development. Instead, we as-
sume that countries are identical in terms of fundamentals. These economies
will be characterized by having heterogeneous agents but identical prefer-
ences across agents, both inside and across countries. There will be di¤erent
goods produced and traded across countries but there will not be a home
bias in the goods basket of any agent in the economy. Also, we will impose
the same composition of public goods and the same technology across goods
and countries. We will have a very simple and extreme characterization of
markets. Goods are perfectly traded across the area and no trade is assume
for countries outside the monetary union. The same is assumed for the only
asset that is available in this union: perfectly traded inside each country
and across countries in the union but no trade outside the union. Labor
markets are standard in international macro: labor is perfectly mobile across
rms inside each country and immobile across economies inside the union.
Therefore, as in Adão and Correia (2018) our focus is on heterogeneity across
households, opening now the ability to trade and to share a currency and a
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central bank, with economies identical up to the distribution of characteris-
tics across households. Can identical countries up to those characteristics be
a¤ected di¤erently with a change in the target ination? And how relevant
is for a particular agent to live in one or in another di¤erent economy? How
is the answer to this question dependent on the specic characteristics of the
agent? These are the important questions we study and that we think should
be answer before those that are currently under scrutiny, when discussing the
best target for the Monetary Union.
As far as we know, our paper is the rst to study the impacts of an
ination regime change and of a redistribution of wealth in an open econ-
omy model with heterogenous households. We investigate how the aggregate
macro variables depend on the existing degree of exogenous inequality in the
economies and whether the decline in ination can decrease inequality in the
countries. We nd that the aggregate e¤ects depend on the exogenous het-
erogeneity, i.e. these e¤ects would not be obtained in a representative agent
framework. The increase of e¢ ciency, due to a change to a lower ination
regime, is dependent on the existing heterogeneity. Also, the e¤ects on equity
tend to reinforce the e¤ects on e¢ ciency: a lower ination increases e¢ ciency
and equity. Finally, an increase in e¢ ciency, or equity in one country a¤ects
positively the other countries. These other countries increase their e¢ ciency
and equity too.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model economy and describes the properties of the equilibrium. Section
3 discusses the solution method, and the results of the numerical exercise.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a very simple exible price international macroeconomic model.
A world of two countries with identical tastes and technologies. The home
country is denoted by H and the foreign country by F . The population
of country H is denoted by SH and the population of country F by SF .
These countries belong to a monetary union, which implies that they share
a common central bank and monetary policy.
Each country has heterogeneous households. We will impose that these
countries are identical in every dimension except on the distribution of ex-
ogenous characteristics across households, which will be reected in di¤erent
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values for the measured income or consumption inequality across countries.
We will assume that goods are traded in perfect markets across these coun-
tries and the same condition applies to the bond that exists in this economy.
We impose as well that labor, the only input in production, is perfectly
mobile across rms inside each country but immobile across countries.
The households have to use transactions services to consume which gen-
erates an endogenous size for the credit good sector. As we are interested in
studying the optimal level of ination in the long run we assume there is no
uncertainty and that ination is fully anticipated by rms and households.
As such, without loss of generality we restrict our focus on the di¤erent
stationary equilibria associated with the di¤erent ination rates. Given sta-
tionarity, the real interest rate is constant across policies and there is a one
to one relationship between changes in ination and changes in the nominal
interest rate. The target for ination will therefore characterize the mone-
tary policy regime, which can be described by the constant nominal interest
rate or the average ination rate.
The simplicity of the described set-up allows us to focus on the role that
money plays in transactions and on the characterization of heterogeneity
across households, as well as on the interaction of these two blocs of the
model. In order to consume households must pay the production price of
the good but must also incur in transactions costs. These depend on the
composition of credit services and cash. As households have the same util-
ity function, if the transactions function is constant returns to scale then
the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, per units of e¢ ciency, is equated among all households. This will not
be consistent with the cited cross section evidence on transactions: it does
not explain that high income individuals use cash and cash plus checks for a
smaller fraction of their transactions than low income individuals; that the
fraction of household wealth held in liquid assets decreases with income and
wealth; and that a nontrivial fraction of households do not own a checking
account or do not use credit cards to perform transactions. However, if the
transactions technology is not of the constant returns type then, as we will
show, the e¤ective price of consumption, the one that measures the marginal
cost for the consumer of adding one additional unit to its aggregate consump-
tion basket, will be di¤erent across households, and this would imply that
the marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption will not
be equated across households. Thus, an increasing returns to scale transac-
tions technology, which is suggested by the data, together with heterogenous
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households generates a friction in the economies. Below, we rst consider the
constant returns to scale technology to built some intuition on some bench-
mark results and later extend the analysis to the increasing returns to scale
technology.
Government expenditures are identical across goods and countries. The
monetary authority of the monetary union issues the common currency, that
is distributed endogenously across countries in order to satisfy demand. Mon-
etary policy sets the interest rate, which is the instrument of monetary policy.
Seigniorage is divided equally across countries.
The households take decisions over consumption, labor, and the means
of payments. Households hold money because it is an alternative means of
payment to costly credit. Credit services are produced according to a pro-
duction function that uses only labor as input. Like in Erosa and Ventura
(2002), we assume that the production function of this service uses one (ef-
ciency) unit of labor per unit of service produced. Competition guarantees
that nancial intermediaries will make zero prots and charge a price equal
to their marginal cost.
Household i of country H does transactions according to the technology:
si;t = l(mi;t 1; Ci;t); for all i 2 SH ;
where si;t, mi;t 1; and Ci;t represent, credit services, real balances and com-
posite consumption of household i; respectively. Function l is decreasing
in mi;t 1 and increasing in Ci;t. In the literature, see for instance Correia
and Teles (1996), it is usually assumed that si;t is time spent in transactions,
which is not traded in the market. Here, whether these services are produced
by some rms in the nancial system or are produced in-the-household is not
important, since the tax on consumption is the alternative nancing instru-
ment to compensate the change of government revenues due to changes of
the target ination. The transaction technology in country F is identical:
si;t = l(m

i;t 1; C

i;t); for all i 2 SF :
We adopt the convention of indexing with a star the variables concerning
country F .
Firms are prot maximizers and use technologies that are linear in labor.1
The productivity, denoted by z, is identical across goods and across countries.
1Although similar, the countries trade because some time in the past there was a com-
plete specialization between the two countries. We take the specialization of production
as given because we assume it was determined a long time ago.
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The rms in each country produce similar goods. At date t the production
of good h, Yh;t, is done in country H; and the production of good f , Yf;t, is
done in country F . The production functions are given by
Yh;t = z
Z
i2SH
(EiNi;t   li) di; and Yf;t = z
Z
i2SF
 
EiN

i;t   li

di;
where Ei is the e¢ ciency of household i that lives in country H and Ni;t is
the labor hours of household i that lives in country H. The Ei and N

i;t are
the corresponding variables for country F:
The households and the government of each country consume a composite
good. In each country there are rms that produce the composite good. At
time t the composite good of country H, Yt, can be obtained using good h,
yh;t, and good f , yf;t, according to
Yt = y

h;ty
1 
f;t ; with 0 <  < 1:
The composite good for country F , Y t , is dened similarly,
Y t = y

h;ty
1 
f;t ; with 0 <  < 1;
where yh;t and y

f;t are the quantities of good h and good f used in the
production of Y t :
We assume that these rms that produce the composite good are perfect
competitors. The price charged per each unit of the composite good is Pt;
and it determined as the minimum expenditure on good h and on good f;
Ph;tyh;t+Pf;tyf;t, that produces one unit of the composite good, i.e. yh;ty
1 
f;t =
1. It can be shown that Pt is given by
Pt = P

h;tP
1 
f;t ; (1)
with     1

   1
1 
1 
, where Ph;t is the price of the good produced in
country H and Pf;t is the price of the good produced in country F . The
assumption that the goods are tradable and the assumption of identical tech-
nologies to produce the composite good imply that price for the composite
good is the same in the two countries.
In equilibrium the markets for the goods of each country clear:
Yh;t = yh;t + y

h;t and Yf;t = yf;t + y

f;t:
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Also, the markets for the composite goods of each country clear:
Yt =
Z
i2SH
Ci;tdi+Gt and Y t =
Z
i2SF
Ci;tdi+G

t ;
where Ci;t is the consumption of the composite good by household i that
lives in country H, Gt is the consumption of the composite good by the
government of country H, Ci;t is the consumption of the composite good
by household i that lives in country F , and Gt is the consumption of the
composite good by the government of country F .
Each household of country H maximizes the discounted sum of future
momentary utility levels, where the discount parameter is , with 0 <  < 1.
That is, household i 2 SH maximizes
1X
t=0
tui;t; (2)
where ui;t is the momentary utility function. Function ui;t is the same across
households, ui;t = u(Ci;t; Ni;t): As in Correia (1999), Domeij and Heathcote
(2004) and Floden (2009) we consider that the momentary utility function, u,
belongs to the GHH class proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man
(1988),
u (Ci; Ni) =
1
1  

Ci   N
1+
i
1 + 
1 
; ;  > 0;   0; and  6= 1, (3)
where  is the curvature parameter,  determines relative importance of
leisure, 1 Ni, and consumption, Ci and 1= is the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. The households of country F have a similar utility function.
The households are heterogeneous in two dimensions. They are di¤eren-
tiated by their e¢ ciency level, and their initial real wealth, represented by
Ei and Ai; respectively. The e¢ ciency levels have a positive support but the
initial real wealth can be negative for some households. Each household sells
hours, Ni;t, in the labor market. The market real wage for each unit of EiNi;t
is wt  zPh;tPt .
The sequence of budget constraints of household i is:
Pt(1+ c)Ci;t+wtPtsi;t+Mi;t+Bi;t  wtPtEiNi;t+Mi;t 1+(1+R)Bi;t 1, for t = 0; 1; 2; :::
(4)
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where Pt is the price of the composite good at date t,  c is the tax on
consumption, and R is the net nominal interest rate. The initial nominal
wealth level of household i, P0Ai, is Mi; 1 + (1 +R)Bi; 1, where Mi; 1 is the
initial nominal money holdings, and Bi; 1 is the initial nominal bonds.
In a stationary equilibrium the intertemporal marginal rate of substitu-
tion for consumption implies:
Pt+1
Pt(1 +R)
= . (5)
From (4) we can write the intertemporal budget constraint of household
i as X1
t=0
Qt [MtR+ Pt(1 +  c)Cit + Ptwsi;t   PtwEiNi;t] = P0Ai, (6)
where Qt = 1(1+R)t ; R  R1+R and Ai  Mi; 1+(1+R)Bi; 1P0 .
Dividing (6) by P0; and using the fact that in a stationary equilibrium
condition (5) is satised, we obtain the stationary budget constraint of house-
hold i,
(1 +  c)Ci + wl (mi; Ci) +Rmi = wEiNi + (1  )Ai, (7)
where we have dropped o¤ the index t to simplify the notation.
The optimal choice of money holdings satises:
 wlmi = R; for
mi
Ci
< 1: (8)
This equation says that the choice of real money is such that the cost of
one additional unity of money, R, should equalize the benet in reducing the
transaction costs, which is the decline in hours spent with credit transactions
that the additional unit of money allows, lmi , times the wage, w.
2.1 Constant returns to scale in transactions
We start by considering the case when the transaction technology is con-
stant returns to scale. It is a useful benchmark case. According with the
evidence, later it will be assumed that the transactions technology has in-
creasing returns, but the comparison with the increasing returns to scale case
is instructive.
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Let function l be homogeneous of degree 1; i.e. constant returns to scale
CRS. It can be written as l(mi; Ci) = L(mi=Ci)Ci. Function L is charac-
terized by L0 < 0 and L00 > 0, so that an increase in the real quantity of
money decreases the time spent with transactions at a decreasing rate. For a
given ratio of money to consumption, mi
Ci
, the marginal and the average labor
productivities on transactions do not depend on the level of consumption.
For a general CRS function, condition (8) implies
 L0

mi
Ci

=
R
w
;
or
mi
Ci
=
m
C
=   (L0) 1
R
wt

; for all i 2 SH : (9)
It follows from (9) that when the transaction technology is CRS, mi
ci
is iden-
tical across households. The quantity of money that a rich household main-
tains, as a fraction of its transactions, is the same as the one held by a poor
household. This implies that this type of technology is not consistent with
the cross section evidence on transactions. As said above, we consider this
case to be used as a benchmark. The budget constraint can be rewritten as
PCi = wEiNi + (1  )Ai; (10)
where the e¤ective price of consumption, P, is
P  (1 +  c) + wL

mi
Ci

+Rmi
Ci
: (11)
It follows that P is constant across households, and includes the direct
tax on consumption,  c; and the indirect cost associated with the means of
payment, wL + Rm
C
. This indirect cost depends on the opportunity cost
of holding cash, R, the unitary cost of labor used in credit, w, and the
transactions technology, L.
The problem of household i can be rewritten as maximizing u(Ci; Ni)
subject to (10). Among the rst order conditions we have
@u
@Ci
= P and @u
@Ni
=  wEi; (12)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of (10). These two conditions imply
that the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
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consumption is equal to the relative price of leisure
 uNi
uCi
=
wEi
P : (13)
Ination imposes two types of welfare costs: the cost of misallocation of
resources from the good sector to the credit sector and a distortion between
the relative price of leisure and its intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
with consumption. A decrease in ination diminishes these two costs, while
a decrease in the consumption tax only reduces the distortion between the
relative price of leisure and its intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
with consumption.
Using (10) and replacing (3) in (13) allows to solve for Ni and Ci :
Ni =

wEi
P
 1

; for all i 2 SH (14)
and
Ci =
wEi
P Ni +
(1  )
P Ai; for all i 2 SH : (15)
Given that the e¤ective price of consumption is identical across house-
holds, there is a representative household for each country. The aggregation
property is conrmed as the labor supply, (14), is independent of the wealth
distribution.
The indirect utility of household i in country H is obtained when (14)
and (15) are replaced in (3)
vi =

1 + 

1

 1


wEi
P
 1+

+
(1  )
P Ai: (16)
The representative agent of country H, i = r, is characterized by Er
= 1 and Ar = 0. The e¢ cient equilibrium allocation corresponds to the one
that maximizes the utility of the representative household, subject to the
budget constraints, of the government and the representative household, and
rst order conditions of the household problem. It is well known that the
e¢ cient allocation satises the Friedman rule, i.e. R = 0; see Correia and
Teles (1996).
The indirect utility of the representative household in country H; vr; is
obtained buy letting in (16) Er = 1 and Ar = 0;
vr =

1 + 

1

 1
 hw
P
i 1+

: (17)
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Since the indirect utility of the representative household, (17), is inversely
related to P, then the smallest P that allows a given public consumption is
the one associated with the e¢ cient allocation. Since the smallest value of P
involves R = 0, then the maximization of the representative household utility
implies that money should not be taxed, i.e. the government should follow
the Friedman rule and set the nominal interest rate to zero. The gain from
reducing ination does not depend on the specic joint distribution of wealth
and labor productivity that characterizes country H. The same conclusion
is valid for country F:
This implies that government expenditures should be nanced with the
consumption tax. Revenue neutral policies that involve declines in ination
and tax expansions increase welfare. It follows, from (17), that the net real
e¤ective wage, w=P goes up as a result of such policies.
The assumption of a CRS transactions technology o¤ers the possibility
of using a simple method to rank policies by their e¤ects on inequality. The
equity ranking of policies can be done by resorting to a relative di¤erential
concept like the one described in Correia (1999). Let households be ordered
by decreasing utility, i.e. i > j implies vi < vj: According to this concept, in
equity terms policy 2 dominates policy 1 if and only if
v2i
v2j
>
v1i
v1j
; for any i and j, such that i > j: (18)
This condition is quite intuitive. Consider any two households in the econ-
omy, household i and household j; where the rst has a lower utility than
the second, i.e. i > j and vi
vj
< 1. If a policy change increases this ratio of
utilities, it means that the "poorer" household becomes less distant (in terms
of utility) from the "richer" household, that is, their economic situation be-
comes more equal than before. When this is true for any two agents then
the policy change is one that leads to a more equal society; it is a policy that
reduces inequality.
Therefore, determining if a policy change reduces inequality involves
checking whether the ratio vi
vj
increases. When households are identical in
labor productivity, Ei = Ej = 1, the relative welfare between agent i and j
can be written, using (16), as
vi
vj
=
 (P) + Ai
 (P) + Aj ,
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where
 (P) = 
1 + 
w
1+

(1  )

1
P
 1

. (19)
If i > j it is because Ai < Aj. Thus, a change in policy increases equity
if  (P) increases as a result.
Consider now a decline in the ination, i.e. a lowerR, that is compensated
by an increase in the tax on consumption, so that the tax revenues are
maintained. The real wage, w, is not a¤ected by this change of policy, but
as we saw above the net real e¤ective wage, wP , increases. The lower ination
tax is e¢ cient because it allows a smaller e¤ective consumption price, P. As
mi
Ci
 1; and mr
Cr
< 1; the base of the consumption tax is higher than the base
of the ination tax. This means that although the tax on consumption,  c,
increases, it increases by less than the decline in the nominal interest rate,
R.2
The conclusion is that a decline in ination compensated by a revenue
neutral increase in the consumption tax rate improves equity, or the welfare
distribution, when all households have the same productivity, Ei = Ej for
all i and j. Typically, both wealth and income are highly concentrated and
very unequally distributed, but income is less concentrated than wealth.3
Thus, this conclusion can be extended to the case, where the distribution of
productivities, the Eis, is less concentrated than the distribution of wealth,
the Ais.
A revenue neutral decline of ination increases the welfare of all house-
holds; i.e. it is a Pareto movement. The richer households are better o¤
because both their initial wealth, in terms of consumption, and the net real
e¤ective wage increase. The poorer households are also better o¤ too. That
happens because as a result of this change in policy, the welfare of the rep-
resentative agent, vr; increases. Since vivr increases for every i poorer than
2Whenever households use credit for a share of their payments, it is because at the
existing interest rate, it is not optimal to use exclusively money as the mean of payment.
In this case, a decline in R implies a positive income e¤ect, that to be compensated implies
an smaller increase in  c: In the limit, when the nominal interest rate is zero and credit is
not used as mean of payment, the ination tax is equivalent to the consumption tax.
3For instance, Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997) report Gini indices for labor earnings, income
(inclusive of transfers) and wealth in 1992 of 0.63, 0.57, and 0.78, respectively, while for
1995 Budria et al. (2002) report values 0.61, 0.55 and 0.80. Moreover, it is well known
that economic models have had di¢ culties in quantitatively generating the observed degree
of wealth concentration from the observed income inequality, see Cagetti and De Nardi
(2008).
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r; where r refers to the representative household, then vi increases for every
i > r: Thus, the proposed policy change increases welfare for every household
in this economy, i.e. is a Pareto movement, and the poorer, even when they
are debtors, increase welfare by more than the richer, the creditors.
2.2 Economies of scale in transactions
So far the transactions technology was assumed to be constant returns to
scale. However, this assumption is at odds with the cross section evidence on
payment patterns. By imposing a transaction technology that is consistent
with the cross section evidence our results change radically. We do not
have aggregation at each country level. As we lose Gorman aggregation
at each country level we open up the terms of trade channel, as we also lose
aggregation at the union wide level.
We begin by showing that the e¤ective consumption price in now idiosyn-
cratic to each household when the technology is increasing returns to scale.
Assume the credit technology l (mi;Ci) is given by,
l (mi;Ci) = k

1  mi
Ci
2
Ci +

1  mi
Ci

N; for any i 2 SH : (20)
Households in country F have a similar transactions technology,
l (mi ; C

i ) = k

1  m

i
Ci
2
Ci +

1  m

i
Ci

N; for any i 2 SF :
The credit technology (20) has increasing returns to scale. The term

1  mi
Ci

N
is a xed cost for a given share of transactions with credit,

1  mi
Ci

.
When this transactions technology is used in the rst order condition (8),
the optimal decision on money holdings is obtained,
mi
Ci
= 1  R
2wk
+
N
2kCi
if Ci >
wN
R
; and (21)
mi
Ci
= 1 if Ci  wN
R
, for any i 2 SH :
It is immediate that, for any N > 0; the larger is the volume of consumption,
Ci the smaller is the share of transactions realized with cash, miCi . It follows
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that the share of cash used in transactions is not constant across households.
Richer households carry a lower share of their transactions with cash than
poorer households.
This money demand is in line with the facts reported in the beginning
of this paper. The portion of transactions paid with cash depends on the
total volume of transactions carried out by the household. Households with
di¤erent Cis have di¤erent miCi s. For instance if household i is such that Ci 
wN
R
; then household i only uses cash to pay for his transactions. Let household
s be the richest household that only uses cash to pay for his transactions,
i.e. one that has a level of transactions Cs; such that Cs = wNR : According to
our ordering of the households then all households i; such that i  s; have
Ci < Cs:
The money demand for the households i  s is mi = Ci: The other subset
of the population, i.e. i < s, use both cash and credit to make payments.
However, they use a higher share of credit, the larger are their transactions,
that is the richer they are. Therefore the higher the households wealth, the
lower is his cash to wealth ratio. For this group of households, those such
that i < s; the money demand is given by mi =
 
1  R
2wk

Ci +
N
2k
:
The budget constraint of household i can be written as
PiCi + w

1  mi
Ci

N = wEiNi + (1  )Ai; (22)
where
Pi  (1 +  c) +Rmi
Ci
+ wk

1  mi
Ci
2
: (23)
The e¤ective price of consumption, Pi; is now specic to each household,
includes an average cost of holding money, Rmi
Ci
, and an average cost of using
credit, wk

1  mi
Ci
2
: Note that not only this price is dependent on the
specic characteristics of each household, the values of Ci and of miCi ; but also
on the value of w;which will be di¤erent from w if the terms of trade are
di¤erent from 1. And the terms of trade will be di¤erent from one if the joint
distributions of initial wealth and e¢ ciency in each country are di¤erent.
The transactions technology considered has a nice property. The het-
erogeneity of the e¤ective price of consumption is a function of the share of
cash payments done by households, which is now di¤erent across households.
Everything else constant, the higher the fraction of payments with cash, the
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higher is the e¤ective price of consumption, since
@Pi
@mi
Ci
= R  2wk

1  mi
Ci

=
wN
Ci
> 0: (24)
It follows that credit technologies with economies of scale imply a non
degenerate distribution of mi
Ci
across households. Poor agents consume less,
hold a higher share of money and face a higher e¤ective price of consumption.
This result is quite important to understand the relation between ination
and inequality. It says that, when the monetary model economy is able to
replicate the payments facts, households react to ination di¤erently, some
decide not to participate in the credit market, and those that participate
choose to participate with di¤erent intensities. For an invariant tax rate on
consumption and real wage, the existence of increasing returns to scale in the
use of credit implies, an e¤ective price of consumption that decreases with
the volume of transactions done. The richer the household is, the lower is
his e¤ective price of consumption.
The e¤ective price of consumption for the poorer households is higher
than the one for the richer ones, i.e. PiPj > 1 for i > j (because Ai < Aj).
When ination increases all households face a higher price but because the
richer households can substitute cash for credit more cheaply, the price faced
by the richer households increases by less than that faced by the poorer
households. The relative price of consumption across agents, i.e. the relative
price PiPj for all i > j, increases with the ination level. Thus, the e¤ect on
equity of an ination regime change is amplied since ination amplies the
exogenous inequality.
This can be shown formally. Using equation (23) the sign of the direct
e¤ect of a marginal change in ination on the ratio PiPj ; i.e. @
Pi
Pj =@R; is given
by
Pjmi
Ci
  Pimj
Cj
=

(1 +  c) + wk

1  mj
Cj
mi
Ci

mi
Ci
  mj
Cj

> 0 (25)
as 1  mi
Ci
>
mj
Cj
; for all i > j: Thus, @ PiPj =@R > 0, ination has a direct
e¤ect on the relative e¤ective price of consumption that is positive. The
direct e¤ect of ination is regressive. Higher ination increases more the
e¤ective tax rate on the consumption of the poorer households than on the
consumption of the richer ones.
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In the previous section we reached the conclusion that when the credit
technology is a constant returns to scale then ination is an additional source
of inequality. An increase in ination, compensated by a decrease in the tax
on consumption, so that the tax revenues are maintained, will increase the
relative di¤erence in utility between "rich" and "poorer" households. How-
ever, when the credit constraint exhibits increasing returns to scale, besides
being a source of inequality, ination is regressive also. In this context we
should expect that a decline of ination would have e¤ects similar to the ones
caused with the implementation of a more progressive scal policy. Thus, we
should expect that with this additional channel, the decline in ination would
reduce inequality further.
The e¤ective price of consumption is specic to the household and the
real wage is specic to the country if the credit technology is not constant
returns to scale. This invalidates the possibility of obtaining aggregation in
the economy, as a necessary condition for aggregation is that the prices faced
by the di¤erent households be identical. Below, we calibrate and compute
numerically the stationary equilibria associated with di¤erent levels of in-
ation in this non-aggregable heterogeneous household model. As always,
when this type of methodology is used, the results are conditional on the
specic calibration. The particular calibration includes both values for the
parameters that determine the aggregate behavior and a joint distribution of
characteristics across households.
2.3 Equilibrium
In this section we describe the various equilibrium equations and solve them.
One of these equilibrium conditions is the budget constraint (22). This equa-
tion can be rewritten as
g(Ci)Ci + w(1  f(Ci))N = wEiNi + (1  )Ai; for all i 2 SH (26)
where g(Ci)  Pi; which is given by (23); and f(Ci)  miCi ; which is given by
(21). There are similar budget constraints for the households of country F
g(Cj )C

j + w
(1  f(Cj ))N = wEjNj + (1  )Aj ; for all j 2 SF : (27)
The intratemporal decisions of the households of countryH and of the house-
holds of country F are such that:
Ni =

wEi

1
g(Ci) + g0(Ci)Ci   wNf 0(Ci)
 1

, for all i 2 SH ; (28)
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and
Nj =
(
wEj

1
g(Cj ) + g0(C

j )C

j   wNf 0(Cj )
) 1

; for all j 2 SF . (29)
Since markets are competitive and rms have a linear technology in labor,
the nominal wage, W is equal to the nominal constant productivity,
W = zPh: (30)
The real wage, w, can be expressed, using (30) and (1), as a function of the
terms of trade, p  Pf
Ph
;
w =
W
P
=
zPh
P
=
z


1
p
1 
; (31)
where     1

   1
1 
1 
: There is a similar condition for the nominal wage
paid by foreign rms, W ,
W  = zPf ,
and for the real wage
w =
zPf
P
=
z

p: (32)
Dene the variable Ci;h and Ci;f for i 2 SH , as the quantities of the home
good and the foreign good, respectively, that the rm that produces the com-
posite home good uses to produce the quantity of composite good Ci. Dene
similarly

Ci;h; C

i;f ;
	
for i 2 SF and

Gh; Gf ; G

h; G

f
	
. These variables
satisfy the following conditions:
Ci = C

i;hC
1 
i;f ; for i 2 SH , with 0 <  < 1; (33)
Ci = C

i;hC
1 
i;f ; for i 2 SF , with 0 <  < 1; (34)
G = GhG
1 
f ; (35)
and
G = Gh G
1 
f : (36)
We assume, as is standard in this literature, that aggregate public expen-
ditures are exogenous, and that the consumption tax rates adjust to satisfy
the government budget constraints of country H and F ,
 c
Z
i2SH
(Ci;h + pCi;f ) di+Rp
1 
Z
i2SH
midi = Gh+pGf +(1  )B, (37)
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and
 c
Z
j2SF
 
Cj;h + pC

j;f

dj +Rp1 
Z
j2SF
mjdj = G

h + pG

f + (1  )B,
(38)
where B and B are the initial public debts of country H and F , respectively.
Since we want to emphasize the case of similar countries we assume that
foreign debt levels are zero, i.e. B +
R
i2SH Aidi = B
 +
R
j2SF A

jdj = 0.
The market clearing conditions in the home good market and in the for-
eign good market areZ
i2SH
Ci;hdi+
Z
j2SF
Cj;hdj+Gh+G

h+z
Z
i2SH
lidi = z
Z
i2SH
EiNidi

; (39)
andZ
i2SH
Ci;fdi+
Z
j2SF
Cj;fdj +Gf +G

f + z
Z
j2SF
ljdj = z
Z
j2SF
EjN

j dj

.
(40)
Optimality in the production of the composite good of country H requires
that the terms of trade, or relative price, p  Pf
Ph
, be equal to the relative
consumption, Ci;h
Ci;f
(or Gh
Gf
), times a relative preference factor,  = 1 

: A
similar condition holds for the producers of the composite good of country
F:
pt = 
Gh
Gf
= 
Gh
Gf
(41)
= 
Ci;h
Ci;f
= 
Cj;h
Cj;f
, for all i 2 SH and j 2 SF . (42)
Using (41), (42), (39) and (40) we get

1  p =
R
i2SH (EiNi   li) diR
j2SF
 
EjN

j   lj

dj
. (43)
This equation expresses the terms of trade as a function of the ratio between
the amount of e¢ ciency units of labor used in the production of the home
good (net of the e¢ ciency units used in credit services in country H) and
the amount of e¢ ciency units of labor used in the production of the foreign
good (net of the e¢ ciency units used in credit services in country F ).
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In general di¤erent households will choose di¤erent money consumption
ratios as they have di¤erent initial wealth levels and e¢ ciency levels. As such
they will face di¤erent e¤ective prices of consumption, which will result in
di¤erent choices of hours. A redistribution of the initial wealth levels, or a
change in the ination rates will a¤ect the choice of hours and in that way
the terms of trade according to (43).
3 Numerical exercise
We take the interest rate, R, the initial wealth levels

Ai; A

j ; Ei; E

j ; B;B
	
and the aggregate government expenditures vector, fG;Gg, as exogenous
variables. As we show below, the endogenous variables fCi; Ci;h; Ci;f ; li; Ni;mi;
w;Gh; G

h;  c; C

i ; C

i;h; C

i;f ; l

i ; N

i ; m

i ; w
; Gf ; Gf ; 

c ; pg, which are 21 in num-
ber, can be expressed as a function of the exogenous variables using 21 static
equilibrium equations that we describe below.
The algorithm used to compute the equilibrium variables is simple. It has
two stages. In the rst stage we compute all the equilibrium variables for a
set of tax rates f c;  cg. In the second stage we check if the set of tax rates
considered can be part of an equilibrium. Thus, we write li and miCi from (20)
and (21) as functions of Ci. Similarly we determine li and
mi
Ci
as functions of
Ci . For a given vector f c;  c ; Rg the vector fCi; Ni; wg is determined from
(26), (28) and (31) as a function of p, and similarly the vector fCi ; Ni ; wg
is determined from (27), (29) and (32) as a function of p: Once we introduce
the variables fNi; li; Ni ; li g, which we just determined as a function of p,
in equation (43) we obtain the equilibrium value for p. Given the terms of
trade, p, and the aggregates fCi; Ci ; G;Gg from (33)-(36), and (41)-(42) we
obtain

Ci;h; Ci;f ; C

i;h; C

i;f ; Gh; G

h; Gf ; G

f
	
. Finally, we check if the vector of
tax rates f c;  cg satises the government budget constraints, (37) and (38).
If not, we go back to stage one, in which we compute all the equilibrium
variables for a new set of candidate tax rates. Each new candidate tax rate
will be slightly lower if the public revenue exceeds the public consumption
and it will be slightly higher otherwise. We keep iterating until (37) and (38)
are satised.
We consider a simple open heterogeneous economy with no government
and only two types of households in each economy, a rich household and a
poor household. The households have the same e¢ ciency levels, Ei = 1 for
all i, but di¤erent wealth levels, the rich household has a larger initial wealth
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than the poor household. The parameter values assumed are reasonable: we
took  = 0:97,  = 1;  = 2;  = 0:5, and z = 1.
We compare the values of the equilibrium variables of countryH in the 10
percent nominal interest rate regime with the ones in the 2 percent nominal
interest rate regime. Figures 1A and 1B show, for a given inequality of
country F and a nominal interest of 10 percent, the country H equilibrium
values for various degrees of inequality in this country. Figures 2A and 2B
display the same information for the case when the nominal interest rate is 2
percent. In country F the initial wealth of the rich household is equal to six
outputs of the country (in units of the composite good) and the initial wealth
of the poor household is equal to one output of the country. This implies that
the average household has an initial wealth of about 3.5 outputs. In country
H we consider that the average household has an initial wealth of about 3.5
outputs too, but allow for many di¤erent distributions of the initial wealth.
In Figures 1A-2B the inequality in country H is represented in the horizontal
axis and it is measured in units of output. More precisely, the variable in
the horizontal axis is the di¤erence in the initial wealth between the rich and
poor household. The extreme inequality considered is an initial wealth level
equal to about 9 outputs for the rich household and  2 outputs for the poor
household.
Heterogeneity plays an important role in the equilibrium. Figure 1A
shows the e¤ective price of consumption, levels, money to consumption ratios
and the consumption tax rate for various levels of inequality. The poor house-
hold e¤ective price decreases monotonically as inequality decreases, while the
rich household price decreases initially, but after a certain level of inequality
starts increasing as inequality decreases. As expected the consumption of
the rich household decreases as his wealth decreases and the consumption
of the poor household increases as his wealth increases. The money to con-
sumption ratio of the rich family increases as inequality decreases while the
money consumption ratio of the poor family only decreases when households
become close to being equal. The behaviors of the money consumption ratios
imply that the consumption tax rate decreases monotonically as inequality
decreases. For the extreme value of inequality considered the tax rate was
about just above 39 percent, while for the case of no inequality the tax rate
was just above 32 percent. The large decrease in the tax rate, almost 7 per-
cent points, associated with the reduction of inequality, is due to the fact
that for the extreme inequality considered the rich household is using money
in less than 10 percent of his transactions, while when households are equal
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they are both using money in 95 percent of their transactions. The tax base
of the ination tax is larger when the households are more equal, and that
allows for a decrease in the consumption tax rate.
Unsurprisingly, as Figure 1B shows, the ratio between the utility of the
poor household and the utility of the rich household, and the sum of the
two households utilities, both increase as inequality decreases. Production in
country H, evaluated in units of the composite good, decreases as inequality
decreases, while the terms of trade increase as inequality decreases. In coun-
try H the prices of the imported good are larger than of the exported good
if inequality is larger in country H than in country F , and the opposite if
inequality is larger in country H than in country F: The percentage increase
in the terms of trade is 3:5 percent when inequality in country H decreases
from 11 to 0.
Independently of the initial inequality in wealth, the change to a lower
ination regime benets both rich and poor households. But the gains of
changing to a lower ination regime in e¢ ciency and equity are larger the
higher is the inequality in the country. This can be seen in Figures 2A-
2B, which display the values of the relevant equilibrium variables in the
two ination regimes. The e¤ective price of consumption is smaller for the
poor household in the low ination regime, and about the same for the rich
household. The consumptions of rich and poor households are higher in the
low ination regime for all levels of inequality. The consumption tax rate
is about the same in the two regimes for large degrees of inequality, but for
more equitable distributions of wealth, as expected, it is much higher in the
low ination regime, to compensate the drop in seigniorage.
In the low ination regime the terms of trade and production are indepen-
dent of the wealth inequality. On the other hand, lower ination promotes
e¢ ciency and equity as both are higher in the low ination regime for all
levels of inequality. Also, the gains on e¢ ciency and on equity of the decline
of ination in the home country are larger the higher the degree of inequality
in the home country.
The equilibrium variables in country H depend on the inequality in coun-
try F . This is shown in Figures 3A-3B, where we keep invariant the distrib-
ution of wealth in the home country and compute the equilibrium in country
H for di¤erent distributions of wealth in the foreign country, when the nom-
inal interest rate is 10 percent. We assume that in the home country the
rich household has a wealth equal to six outputs of the country (in units of
the composite good) and the initial wealth of the poor household is equal to
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one output of the country. Thus, the average household in country H has
an initial wealth of about 3.5 outputs. In country F we consider that the
average household has an initial wealth of about 3.5 outputs too, but allow
for many di¤erent distributions of the initial wealth, which is represented
in the horizontal axis of the Figures 3A-3B. As before, the variable in the
horizontal axis is the di¤erence in the initial wealth between the rich and
poor household, and the extreme inequality considered is an initial wealth
level equal to about 9 outputs for the rich household and  2 outputs for the
poor household.
Figure 3A shows that as the distribution of wealth in the foreign coun-
try becomes more equal, the consumptions in the home country increase for
both types of households, which allows for a decrease in the consumption
tax rate and the e¤ective consumption prices. The money to consumption
ratio decreases for the rich household as inequality in country F decreases
because the rich household consumes more as inequality in country F de-
creases. Figure 3B shows that the the good produced in country H becomes
more expensive as inequality decreases in country F; i.e. the terms of trade
(p  pf
ph
) decrease as equality increases in country F: Moreover, Figure 3B
shows that production in country H; e¢ ciency in country H, and equity in
country H increase. Thus, we conclude that in open economies, for a given
distribution of characteristics in the home economy, the higher the inequal-
ity in the foreign country the lower are the e¢ ciency and equity in the home
country for a given interest rate. Also, the terms of trade decrease with the
equality in the foreign country.
Additionally, we compare the e¤ect on the e¢ ciency and equity in country
H, for various levels of inequality in country H of a redistribution in country
F: Figure 4 shows the results for 3 distributions of inequality in country H:
one in which the wealth levels are equal across households, one in which the
rich household has an initial wealth level equal to 6 outputs and the poor
household an initial wealth level equal to 1 output, and another in which the
rich household has an initial wealth level equal to 9 outputs and the poor
household has an initial wealth level equal to  2 outputs. We determine that
the gains on e¢ ciency and on equity in the home country of the decline in
inequality in the foreign country are larger the higher the degree of inequality
in the home country.
Finally, we look at how the interaction between the nominal interest rate
and inequality in the foreign country a¤ects e¢ ciency and equality in the
home country. Figure 5 shows for various levels of inequality in country F;
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the equity and e¢ ciency levels for country H; for the nominal interest rates
of 10 percent and 2 percent when the rich household in country H has an
initial wealth of six outputs and the poor household one unit of output. We
conclude that the gains on e¢ ciency and on equity of the decline of ination
in the home country are larger the higher the degree of inequality in the
foreign country.
We conclude that the e¤ects on equity and e¢ ciency of a change to a
lower ination regime are positive and larger, the higher is the inequality
in the home country or in the foreign country. Moreover, the e¤ects of a
redistribution either in country H or in country F are larger, the higher is
the ination regime. Thus, for a high ination and inequality the e¤ects on
equity and e¢ ciency of a redistribution are similar to the e¤ects of a change
to a low ination regime.
4 Conclusion
The aggregate equilibrium in a multi-country model is a¤ected signicantly
by the heterogeneity in each country. Two groups of countries that are iden-
tical in everything, except on the exogenous householdswealth distribution,
will have di¤erent aggregate equilibria. We obtain that a redistribution of
wealth in a given country increases equity and e¢ ciency in that country,
but it also increases equity and e¢ ciency in the other countries. Another
important result is that common policy changes have idiosyncratic e¤ects in
the countries that are part of the monetary union. We investigate the e¤ects
of an ination regime switch. A decrease in the target (steady state) ina-
tion brings about an increase in e¢ ciency and equity in all countries, but the
magnitude of the e¤ects depends on the level of the initial heterogeneity. The
gains with the reduction in ination are higher in the countries that have a
larger exogenous initial heterogeneity. While in the literature it is already
established a connection between ination and inequality, there is to our
knowledge no strong results on how the relation between changes in ination
and the aggregate outcome is inuenced by the underlying heterogeneity.
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Figure 1A
Variables of country H for a nominal interest rate of 10%,
the distribution of the initial wealth in country F is fixed, while it varies in country H,
(the difference in the initial wealth between the two groups is in the horizontal axis) 
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Variables of country H for a nominal interest rate of 10%,
the distribution of the initial wealth in country F is fixed, while it varies in country H,
(the difference in the initial wealth between the two groups is in the horizontal axis) 
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Variables of country H 
the distribution of the initial wealth in country F is fixed, while it varies in country H,
(the difference in the initial wealth between the two groups is in the horizontal axis) 
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the distribution of the initial wealth in country F is fixed, while it varies in country H,
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Variables of country H for a nominal interest rate of 10%,
the distribution of the initial wealth in country F changes, while it is constant in country H,
(the difference in the initial wealth between the two groups is in the horizontal axis) 
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Variables of country H for a nominal interest rate of 10%,
the distribution of the initial wealth in country F changes, while it is constant in country H,
(the difference in the initial wealth between the two groups is in the horizontal axis) 
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Variables of country H for a nominal interest rate of 10%,
the distribution of the initial wealth in country F changes, while it is constant in country H,
(the difference in the initial wealth between the two groups is in the horizontal axis) 
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Variables of country H,
the distribution of the initial wealth in country F changes, while it is constant in country H,
(the difference in the initial wealth between the two groups is in the horizontal axis) 
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